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PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN-A~1ER ICAN RELATIONS 
I. 
To put into balance what I shall say later I should like 
at the outset to be very clear on several things. In Atlantic 
and Western European matters the postwar period is rich in 
achievement; it is a record not of failure but of success. 
NATO, the OECDg new habits and patterns of consultation -- all 
are accepted as a matter or courseJ . There is also the 
remarkable economic grov1th of Western Europe$) its political 
stability and. its genius applied to the progress toward. European 
·unity. More immediately, the world should. share the satisfaction 
of Germamin what the Federal Republic has accomplished economic-
ally, in the strength and effectiveness of its democratic processes 
and in the enlightenment of its fore!gn policy. 
. . . 
.. 
Still i'n pursuit of perspective lef me emphasize the 
strength and continuity of United States policy toward Europe. 
The President has reiterated that this is the primary foreign 
policy interest of the United States: within this larger frame-
work he has indicated the support of his Administration fo~ the 
process of European unity, as has Secretary Rogers. Because 
the President feels so keenly that this is a matter primarily 
for Europeans to decide there have been some who misconstrue 
discretion for a shift in policyJ In point of factg there has 
been no shift of national priorities or indeed of national a\'Tare-
ness of the fundamental importance of Europe to our survival. 
I have stressed ·these durable and favorable elements because 
j >Wh.at I shall now say may seem entirely gloomy and at points appear 
critical of European policy and performance. But whatever use I 
may be to you on this occasion is in presenting a clear and 
., . 
. . 
- 2 -
clinical view of ~rican attitudes about the European Community, 
I wish to add that. in th• .interests of brevity some of the 
points I shal-l make may .seem too stark and that a mor·e nuanced 
appraisal would be more accurate, Perhaps, But my initial 
gurpose is to offer you a quick and succinct indication of current 
. . . Amer~can att~tudes. 
II., · 
~he immediate ·response to the question: · "What does America 
think today of the European Community?" must be» "It does not 
think abo;.\t it very J1\Uch 4 11 Hhatcvcr- comment thor•e may be in the 
American press will generally be found on the financial pages u-
and only of ~he la~ge metropolitan newspapers., The image is of a -~ 
tangl~d and complicated economic organization involved in 
inexplicable internal and endless argumento There is practicallu 
no awareness of the deep-seated European interest in progress 
toward political unity; that the Community is a means to that end. 
It is at the level of economic activity that the Americans 
sense that the Community exists., There is a vague awareness of· 
a booming European economy, of vigorous ~rade and, of course, 
of in~cstm~nt opportunities~ But unfortunately conventional 
wisdom in America has judged the Community protectionist and 
inward-looking o There is an exact cor•relation between awareness 
of the Community and awareness of a European agriculture policy 
that has reduced American exports to.the Community and has led 
to massive subsidies of surpluses to compete in our traditional 
markets elseHhere in the Hor·ldo There is a strong feeling that 
Europe is insensitive to the economic problems and the political 
and military burdens we must carr·y., 
. In sum, the wide enthusiasm for the Community in America of 
the Eisenhower and Kennedy periods 9 the rosy expectation of 
rapid and brilliant progress toward unity h~s largely evaporated 
and been replaced by irritation~ fru~tration and a brooding // 
sense of appr•ehension as to v7hat the future 'will hold J 
If this 
for it? 
-III~ 
is the unpleasant picture what is the explanation 
In part the answer must be sought in an appraisal of the 
domestic pr•oblcms be.setting our countr·y, The list of rrtajor· issues 
is well kno'.-tn to you~ tho:? pr·oblcmn of the minority groups; the 
urban crisis; law cznd order•; how to arrest the destruction of 
our human environment; contr•ol of inflation; and a cor·rection 
··of our·persistent balance of payments deficit~ This is a tough 
•:.:. ·agenda. for our country. Many of the problems. go back to the 
early days of our nation; others are·more immediate and novel. 
All are difficult.· 
. . 
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And the long shadow of Vietnam lies over America's present 
and future role in the \·ro:rldo This national agony has sharpened 
doubts as to the rr.erit 1 even the neGessity 1 of American involve-
ment in affairs overseas~ It is indeed latent isolationism~ 
After a postwar period of active involvement, of leadership and 
initiative there is a nagging American worry that "nothing 
seems to worko" 
The combination of these two broad currents hardly eases the· 
task of an American President who wishes to hold firm to tested 
policies of Atlantic. interdependenceo 
I am afraid that·Eu:rope has made its contribution to this 
shift in America6 attitudeso 
, 
From January 1963 .until The Hague summit meeting last December/ 
was a ~-long winter in·. European affairso The Member States seemed 
to be engaged in hopelessly technical internal battles with 
no end in sight o · \·Jha tever p:rogres s was made seemed so narrow and 
illusive as to repel rather than to attracto There was no agree-
ment at the political level of the fv1ember States as to the 
ultimate goals or the geographic dimensions of the Community. 
. During this seven-year drought America became aware· of two 
major adverse effects of the Community: agriculture and the 
a~sociation and preferential arrangementso 
Aften ten years of remarkable growth of our agricultural 
exports to the EEC~ in 1968 there began a decline of 6 percent 
each year~ American concern about this decline must be seen in 
the context of America 9 s rel~tive efficiency in agriculture, our 
traditional market in \·!estern Europe, an urgent national need 
for exports to balance out our accounts~ and. the fact that 
the agricultural interest groups have been among the strong, 
traditional supporters of liberal foreign economic policies o 
To make matters worse 1 as surpluses ·bui-lt up in Europe tlue to the high price levels of the CA~ the Community began dumping agri-
cultural goods in certain of our traditional markets ~- for 
instance, wheat to Taiwan, lard to Britain,. feed grains to Japano 
Sharing the stage with agriculture as a contentious issue 
is the mounting concern in the United States over the widening 
circle of association arrangements and preferential agreements 
betv1een the Community and both the dE:veloped and the less 
developed countrieso So that you can realize the full impact 
of this Community activity on American opinion let me list the 
countries with which negotiations are in process or which appear 
imminent: f·~alta~ Israel, Spain, the Arab States, Austria, 
Sweden and Switzerlando Arrangements already. exist with the 
francophone African countries, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, 
· . with Greece and Turkey. , .·.. · . , · ..
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For the LDCs most of the arrangements involve only partial 
tariff reductions,by the EEC and contain provisions for reverse 
preferences given by the recipient· states to the EECo As they 
do not foresee and hav..e no schedule for ult"imate free trade or . 
a customs union, most of these arrangements seem on the face of 
; it incompatible with the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade~ 
· A similar alarm was expressed last month by DirectoraGeneral 
Long of the GATT when he spoke here in Germanyo 
'There are serious issues raised by this Community action, 
issu~s that do not seem to be fully appreciated by either the· 
Commission or the Member States~ First, as Mro Long has said, 
this pattern of preferential arrangements contains the real 
ris.~ of fatally undermining the GATT systemo As the largest 
trading entity in··the world and with trade a major element in t~e 
European GNP, presumably the Community has the largest stake in 
the integrity and "indeed in the strengthening of this systemo , 
Beyond this, to embark on preferential arrangements inevitably 
cr~ates resentment on the part of those c6untries outside the 
boundaries of the new arrangements =~ either they must be 
brought in or they mav be driven to similar discriminatory 
regional arrangements~ 
Nor should you underestimate the effect of these arrangements 
on the United Stateso And the adverse effect is magnified by 
the general range of American problems I outlined earliero 
European actions are seized upon to justify protectionist moves 
in the United States and thus spur them ono It endangers the 
Administration 9 s efforts to persuade the Congress to pass the 
trade legislation and to repeal American Selling Priceo It cannot 
. but make more difficult the· President 'Is task in gaining acceptance 
of the proposed generalized preference scheme which he has 
advocatedc:~ 
Unfortunately the fallout from these two major issues --
agriculture and preferential arrangements ~- cannot be restricted 
to the field of our economic relations o Tpe Congress shares 
the President 9 s burden of reconciling ·domestic demands~ obligations 
overseas and measurts to reduce inflationo This distinguished 
audlence hardly needs to be reminded of.the pressures building 
up regarding the American troop commitment to NATOc As our 
legislators fac~ this problem manyD perhaps the critical majority,~ 
are bound to be affected by the ~anner in which these important 
economic issues are resolvedo 
IV, 
As The Hague meeting ma.rked a \'la thershed in European develop-
rrents it could also mark a critical point in relations between 
the E~ropean Community and the United Stateso It is my judgment, already forecast I suspect by what I have.said, that, · 
to a very considerable extent, what happens with these relations 
depends on Europe~ American opinion and policy will primarily 
react to progr·ess in Europe =- progress in the internal develop-
ment of the Community and in its enlar6ement, But "iven recent-· 
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history and our own preoccupations it w6uld be dangerous and 
certainly short-sighted t~ think that success on both of these 
·.fronts Hill be autorr.atically understood or app.reciated by 
A~~ricans~ For instance, in 1962 America was enthusiastic in 
anticipation of British entry~ Today a more uneasy America 
gives considerable attention to possible economic costs after 
Britain and the other applicants are ino I am convinced that 
America needs close attention and the benefit of clear explana-
tions of the goals of Europe and the process necessary to 
achieve'these goalso : 
For my 0\vn vantage point 1 as I vie\'1 the European and the 
American scene, there is a striking difference in the way 
Europe .. ~onverses with itself and the dialogue it has with 
the United Stateso The conversation among Europeans these days ,, 
is full of ne\v ideas 1 disagreement, movement 1 over the process 
of European unityo The public ·opinion polls and the media 
express impatience with governments and the slow pace of events. 
Yet what Europeans say to Americans reflects very little of this 
European preoccupation vli th 1 and excitement over, the process 
or unificationo What Americans see and feel are immediate 
economic problems and dislocationso These norm~l adjustments 
are not put in context by European political figures and 
presented as part of a dynamic process of political development. 
If Americans no longer see the romance or the' historical sweep / 
of European unity it is because the Europeans have forgotten 
to tell themo 
. .• 
It is of great importance that Europeans are debating how 
the Community should develop in the political or even in the 
defense fieldso. To suggest that Americans should be brought 
close to this debate• I assure you, is hot a plea that America 
should be a part of this processe It is a plea that American 
attitudes at a critical moment would be greatly helped if my 
countrymen were to be aware of the gbals the ~uropeans are 
setting for themselves and of the movement which is felt today 
in Europeo 
. 
Speaking in an entirely personal capacity~ but taking into 
account the difficulties and the uncertainties in America, it 
seems to me that there are powerful reasons why the European 
Community should consider taking initiatives in certain areas 
based on its own competence~ economic weight and enlightened 
self-interest o 
As I have suegested earlier~ th~ world trading system is 
under acute pressureo We have. found in the past that in this 
field we ·cannot stand still; either progress in liberalism will 
be made or ever-present protectionist forces will tend to erode 
the progress so laboriously achievedo Both the United States and 
Europe have said that the next area of wbrk is the non-tariff 
barriers. The Community must in any event engage itself 
in this field internally as it works tovJard economic union so 
there is logic in Europe's ta~ing the lead in pressing for 
.., 
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international action to eliminate and reduce these restrictionso 
Much of the preparatory \'/Ork has been done in Genevao What is 
needed is an effective lead~ 
Also within the frame\':ork of European competence and self-
interest is the need to reconsider the system of association 
arra~gements, to assess the impact of this system on the GATT 
to insure that the -GATT is not only preserved but strengthenedo 
Time is running out on this problem, One answer of course 
\·'ou1d b'"' ~o !"lr'.''"',"!'!'lt" ""1.-"" <1 c.''",•"">'""'n.L. of +-he "Cn"'..,.,...,lo~.-,,d 
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preference scheme so tha~-rather than discriminatory arrangements 
theAeveloping couptrie~'would all have equitable access~ on 
a non-discriminato~y basis~ to the markets of the advanced '• 
countries o · ''· 
When one thinks of the innovations in international 
behavior and organization marked by the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and the GATT in the early postwar . 
period it would not seem unreasonable to hope for new initiatives 
of comparable magnitudea In the financial field the Special 
Drawing Rights are such·an initlative, For instance 9 it seems 
to me that the moment may have arrived l'rhen consideration could 
be given to_improved techniques for objective~ authoritative 
fact-finding in defined commercial policy areaso Systems of 
fact-finding could lead to new methods of arbitrating disputes 
so that the world could move beyond the present primitive system 
of compensation and retaliationo But this is no more than 
illustrative of.the need for new ideas and a plea that this is 
an area in which the Community is cohesive 9 \'lhere it has a 
- .. , 
major economic self=interest and where if.it does not act 
no one else willo 
There is one-final area where=Eu~o~ean initiatives could 
be particularly helpful~ if not essential, ~nd psychologically 
of great valueo I am not much impressed nor do I think the 
Commission is much impressed by the institutional means the 
CommJ:J.nity and the United States have for working O'J.t solutions 
to problemso As a prefederal entity the Community is bound to 
find problem:2so 1 vi ng diff icul'c i'li thi;'l the presen·c political 
structure where authority is distribu~ed among the Commission 1 
the Council of Ministers and the Memb~r States~ As our govern-
mental system has somEnrhat similar cre.ra::teris-cic.s we understand 
. your procedural difficulties~ But if the probl~ms that arise 
day to day between the Community and the Unit~d States are 
not to overwhelm us~ then new and more effective arrangements ~/ 
must be devisedo 
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i·: · My initial optimism, the long view~ even my critical 
assessment of America and Europ.e ~ all of these rest on certain 
important assump~ionso · 
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The first assumption is that we are bound together by common 
intere~ts not threatened by conflicting interestso These common 
interests include defense, balanced economic growth, the only dim-
ly appreciated problems of the postindustrial society and our 
relations with the developing nationso . 
Second~ our economic ttelatioris atte basic, extensive, complex. 
and will inevitably be mattked by points of frfctiono If. the 
politipal goals of Europe are obscure or if we lack a political 
frame\<~Ot'k fott our relations, then we run the tteal risk that the 
problems and the_friction will dominate our affairso 
T,hittd, govettnme~ts by their natutte have a limited span of 
attention ~- there are only so many problems or crises that can ' 
be handled with imagination and skillo Given our own domestic 
and foreign problems it is unreasonable to believe that the complex 
issues related to the immediate development of the Community 
will compete successfully with other urgent matters before the 
American Governmento This means to me that from its base of 
economic strength, its sense of responsibility and indeed in 
~~ its own self-interest, more active European leadership in 
steering Community-American relations is in ordero. 
Fourth, unfortunately there are lilJ!its to·_the pace and the 
degree of political innovation~ change and progress that 
can be realistically anticipatedo The task of European unification 
is herculeano If the pace is less .than the public expects then 
governments must accept the responsibility of explanation in 
·order to ease the frustrations of an impatient publico 
My final assumption is that the dangers iri transatlantic · -· 
relations today arise not from any calculated p~licies 9 either 
American or European, but from misadventure~ Preoccupation 
and introspection on both sides or·the Atlantic provide the 
breeding ground for unintentioned eonflicto ~out of this action 
and reaction it is unfortunately not inc~nceivable .that irreparable/ 
damage could be doneo In a sense this is the sad lesson of modern 
history -- to see only in retrospect where the critical errors 
\'Jere made o 
If I may end on a carefully optimistic notee I have not the 
slightest doubt that American interest in and support for the 
European Community can be revived, Nothing has really shaken 
the American support for this ideal or seriously altered our 
recognition that a structural chang~ of this magnitude would 
involve short-term costs and adjustments oy the United Stateso 
While the progress made at The Hague summit and at the subsequent 
Council of Ministers Jneetings is important, it is not enougho 
To assume that any progress that satisfied the Europeans will 
satisfy America is very riskyo In fac~, in the absence of some 
special European effort the American reaction is just as likely 
to be that Europe is engrossed only in its own affairs, with 
slight attention to their effect on othn~s~ and that· European 
. • 
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unification is less the ba~is for a more effective Atlantic 
relationship than the construction of Pax Europao 
An American Ambassador said once of a small Latin American 
country to Hhich he was assigned • 11 'J.1he situation is hopeless; 
but not serious~ 11 The problem of relations bet\<leen a dynamic and 
expanding European Community and the United States is se~ious, 
but far from hopelesso 
I 
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